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Abstract
This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal
preferences (values), material or other explicit incentives (laws) and social sanctions or rewards
(norms). It rst examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individualsbehaviors
and inferences, and how they interact with material incentives. It then characterizes optimal
incentive-setting in the presence of norms, deriving in particular appropriately modied versions of
Pigou and Ramsey taxation.
Incorporating agentsimperfect knowledge of the distribution of preferences opens up to analysis
several new questions. The rst is social psychologistspractice of norms-based interventions,
namely campaigns and messages that seek to alter peoples perceptions of what constitutes normal
behavior or values among their peers. The model makes clear how such interventions operate, but
also how their e¤ectiveness is limited by a credibility problem, particularly when the descriptive
and prescriptive norms conict.
The next main question is the expressive role of law. The choices of legislators and other
principals naturally reect their knowledge of societal preferences, and these same community
standardsare also what shapes social judgements and moral sentiments. Setting law thus means
both imposing material incentives and sending a message about societys values, and hence about
the norms that di¤erent behaviors are likely to encounter. The analysis, combining an informed
principal with individually signaling agents, makes precise the notion of expressive law, determining
in particular when a weakening or a strengthening of incentives is called for. Pushing further this
logic, the paper also sheds light on why societies are often resistant to the message of economists, as
well as on why they renounce certain policies, such as cruel and unusual punishments, irrespective
of e¤ectiveness considerations, in order to express their being civilized.
Keywords: motivation, incentives, esteem, reputation, honor, stigma, social norms, culture, taxa-
tion, law, punishments, norms-based interventions, expressive content.
JEL Classication: D64, D82, H41, K1, K42, Z13.
Introduction
To foster desired behaviors, economists emphasize (with a number of caveats) material incen-
tives provided through contracts, markets or policy. While these often work very e¤ectively, there
also many puzzling cases where incentives fail to have the desired e¤ects (e.g., crowding out) or,
conversely minor ones have a disproportionately large impact (crowding in, shift in norms).1 Soci-
eties also sometimes insiston what seem like ine¢ ciently costly forms of incentives (e.g., prison
rather than nes or reparations) or renounce others that might be quite cheap or e¤ective (paying
for organ donations, corporal punishments, public shaming).
Rather than incentives, psychologists emphasize persuasion and social inuence, in particular
through manipulations of collective identity, peer comparison and other interventions aimed at
changing the social meaningof actions and shifting the norms that prevail in a population.2 This
body of work o¤ers many valuable insights and a wide knowledge base of experimental regularities,
but no clear analytical framework.
Legal scholars, nally, certainly agree on the importance of incentives, but many argue that
the law is not merely a price system for bad and good behaviors it also plays an important
role in expressing and shaping the values of society. The spectrum of opinions ranges from pure
consequentialiststo pure expressivists, but here also the underlying architecture exactly how
laws do or should convey societal valuesremains elusive. Thus, the expressive content of law is
sometimes invoked to call for harsher measures and sometimes for more lenient ones, or appealed
to both for and against a given form of punishment.
These apparently disjoint approaches are in fact highly complementary and can be fruitfully
brought together to shed new light on the determinants of compliance and the e¤ects of incentives.
To this e¤ect, we develop in this paper a unifying framework to analyze how private decisions as
well as public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences (values), material or other
explicit incentives (laws) and social sanctions or rewards (norms).
We rst show how honor, stigma and social norms a social multiplier, more generallyarise
from individualsbehaviors and inferences, and when they are strengthened or undermined by the
presence of material incentives. We then characterize optimal incentive-setting in the presence of
norms, deriving appropriately modied versions of Pigou and Ramsey taxation that correct not
just for standard externalities but also for the zero-sum aspect of image-seeking. In particular,
this reputation taxmakes the optimal incentive depend, nonmonotonically, on aggregate shifts
in costs or preferences that a¤ect the overall rate of compliance. For well-behaved (unimodal)
distributions of individual values, the subsidy is lowest for behaviors with very high or very low
participation rates (as these respectively induce maximal stigma and maximal honor), and highest
1Examples of such puzzles include e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini [2000a,b], Fehr and Gächter [2001], Knez and
Simester [2001], Fehr and Falk [2002], Fehr and Rockenbach [2003], Falk and Kosfeld [2006], Karlan and List [2007],
Ariely et al. [2009], Panagopoulos [2009], Funk [2010] and Fryer [2010]. See, e.g., Bowles [2008] and Bowles and Reyes
[2009] for recent surveys of the empirical puzzles, and Gibbons [1997] and Prendergast [1999] for the more classical
literature on incentives in organizations.
2See, e.g., Cialdini [1984], Cialdini et al. [2006], Prentice and Miller (1993), or Schultz et al. [2007].
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for behaviors in the grey zonewhere compliance and noncompliance are both common behaviors
(and social pressure is thus at its weakest).
Next, we incorporate into the model the idea that the distribution of preferences in society may
be only imperfectly known by agents. Allowing for such aggregate uncertainty, in addition to the
individual heterogeneity standard in signaling models, opens up to analysis a number of ideas and
practices found mostly outside economics, but closely linked to the study of incentives.
The rst is social psychologistspractice of norms-based interventions, namely campaigns and
messages that seek to alter peoples perceptions of what constitutes normalbehavior (or values)
among their peers. We make clear how such interventions operate, but also how their e¤ectiveness is
limited by a credibility problem, particularly when the descriptiveand injunctivenorms (what
most people do, versus what most approve of) are in conict.
The next and central question we analyze is the expressive role of law. Whether intended to
foster the common good or more narrow objectives, laws and other policies reect the knowledge
that decision-makers have about societal preferences. These same community standardsare also
what shapes social norms (conferring esteem or stigma) and moral sentiments (pride and shame).
Thus, imposing a heavy sentence for some o¤ense or a zero price on certain transactions means
both setting material incentives and sending a message about societys values, and hence about the
norms according to which di¤erent behaviors are likely to be judged. The analysis, combining an
informed principal with individually signaling agents, makes precise the notion of expressive law,
determining in particular when a weakening or a strengthening of incentives is called for.
Somewhat surprisingly, the answer turns out to be entirely independent of whether individual
behaviors are complements (the usual understanding of a norm) or substitutes (search for dis-
tinction). Instead, it hinges on what specic variable the law signals agentsgeneral willingness
to contribute to the public good, or the value to society of such contributions. The underlying
intuition, and the main thread running through our analysis, is that the principal can use mul-
tiple currencies to shape agentsbehavior. In the empirically relevant case where rewards and
punishments are costly to implement, he will seek to economize on them by harnessing agents
other sources of motivation intrinsic and reputational. Thus, when better informed about prevail-
ing standards of behavior, he tries to signal that social sanctions or payo¤s are large by lowering
extrinsic incentives, at some cost in compliance. In contrast, when the asymmetric information
concerns the magnitude of the externalities that agents impose on each other (and provided that
they care more, the larger their social impact), the principal seeks to enhance their intrinsic mo-
tivation by convincing them that the externalities are large, and this now involves setting higher
incentives than under symmetric information.
Pushing further this logic, we extend the model to also shed light on why societies are often
resistant to economistsmessages about the virtues of incentives, as well as on why they forego cer-
tain policies, such as cruel and unusualpunishments, irrespective of e¤ectiveness considerations,
in order to express their being civilized.
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 Related literature. The need for an integrated analysis of law and social norms is stressed,
among others, by Ellickson [1998], Lessig [1998] and McAdams and Rasmusen [2007], who provide
an excellent survey. The expressive role of law is emphasized in particular by Sunstein [1996], Kahan
[1997], Cooter [1998], Posner [1998, 2000a,b] and McAdams [1999]. Our signaling formalization is
most closely related to the approach advocated by the last two authors.3 Recent experimental
evidence on the expressive e¤ect of incentives is provided by Tyran and Feld [2006], Galbiati and
Vertova [2008], Galbiati et al. [2010] and Bremzeny et al. [2011].
The interaction of incentives with other forms of motivation under symmetric information is
studied by, among others, Frey [1997], Brekke and Nyborg [2003], Besley and Ghatak [2005] and
Bénabou and Tirole [2006a], and we start by extending the model of prosocial behavior developed
in this last paper to new settings (distributions of preferences, distortive taxation) and results.
Kaplow and Shavell [2007] consider a social planner who, instead of incentives, has access to a
costly inculcationtechnology for feelings of guilt and virtue (acting respectively as a tax and a
subsidy) and characterize the optimal mix of these two instruments. Fischer and Huddart [2008]
study the impact of incentives when agents engage in both desirable and undesirable behaviors
(e.g., performance falsication) which the principal cannot tell apart, but which are subject to
separate social norms among agents, giving rise to di¤erent social multipliers.
The informed-principal problem that arises with expressive law bears some relationship to those
in Bénabou and Tirole [2003], Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008] and Herold [2010], but with the
important di¤erence that what agents now try to infer the prevailing social standardembodies
everyones equilibrium actions and beliefs. The idea that incentives convey information about the
distribution of preferences is shared with Sliwka [2008] and van der Weele [2009], but the nature of
normative inuences is quite di¤erent. In the rst paper, social complementarities operate through
conformist types, whose preference is to mimic whatever action the majority chooses. In the
second they involve reciprocal altruists, whose taste for contributing to a public good rises with
total contributions. Our model has no built-in complementarity; conformity or distinction e¤ects
arise endogenously, and we analyze expressive law in both cases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the model and basic results concerning
honor, stigma, and the social multiplier. Section 2 characterizes optimal incentives under common
knowledge about societal values. Section 3 takes up norms-based interventions and Section 4
analyzes the expressive role of law. Section 5 discusses robustness, while Section 6 concludes with
directions for further research.
3An alternative route for laws to a¤ect social norms is an evolutionary process of preference adaptation; e.g., Huck
[1998], Bohnet et al. [2001], Bar-Gill and Fershtman [2004], Tabellini [2008] and Guiso et al. [2008].
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1 Model
1.1 Basic framework
 Agents. A continuum of agents each choose some discrete action a 2 f0; 1g; with resource
cost (time, e¤ort, etc.) ca; c > 0: Each also receives from some principal an incentive of ya: In
a rm or organization, a represents working rather than shirking, abstaining from opportunism,
etc., and y a wage rate or performance-contingent bonus. In a public-goods context a is some
prosocial action such as not polluting, voting, contributing, etc., with y representing a subsidy on
the provision of the public good or, conversely, a penalty (tax, ne, prison) on undesirable behaviors
(i.e., on  a).
To represent agents preferences we use the simplest specication that encompasses the three
key ingredients of intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives and (social or self) esteem concerns:
U = (v + y   c)a+ ea+  E(v j a): (1)
We refer to v as the agents intrinsic motivation. In a rm or organization it corresponds to
liking and motivation for the task (sales, research), work ethic, etc. In a public-goods context, it
represents the agents degree of altruism or prosocial orientation, whether general or activity-specic
(e.g., concern for the environment); each agent then also derives a benet e (for externality) from
the aggregate supply, a:4 ; 5
Decisions also carry reputational costs and benets, reecting the judgements and reactions of
others as they assess an agents intrinsic motivation, which is private information, in light of his
actions. These concerns, represented by the last term in (1), can be purely hedonic (valuing social
esteem per se) or instrumental.6 Thus, in a labor-market, career concerns make it valuable to be
seen by employers as having a strong work ethic, caring about the activity in question, etc. In the
social sphere, people perceived as generous, public minded, good citizens, etc., are more likely to
be chosen as mates, friends, or leaders. Reputational payo¤s can also be reinterpreted as the value
of self-image or moral sentiments, with each individual judging his true character by his own
conduct: self-signaling works much like social signaling, with memorability or salience substituting
4 It does not matter at this stage whether v reects, in Andreonis [1989] terminology: (i) pure altruism, meaning
that the agent values his actual contribution to others welfare via his impact on a; and requiring group size to
be small (in this case the vs are linked to e; see Section 4.3); (ii) impure altruism, arising from a joy of giving
(social and self esteem are accounted for separately in (1)) or reecting Kantian-type reasonings in which the agent
overscales his real impact on a (e.g., Brekke et al. [2003]). On intrinsic motivation in rms or organizations, see also
Besley and Ghatak [2005].
5One can easily allow for a di¤erential impact of a across agents, but focussing on its average value is su¢ cient
for most purposes. Also for simplicity, we abstract from decreasing or increasing returns in the value of a:
6The evidence supporting the role of reputational concerns is extensive; see footnote 24 for some examples, based on
manipulations of the acts visibility. On the modeling side, value functions derived from an explicit second-stage game
may not be linear (e.g, Rotemberg [2008]), or may involve weights that vary with the agents type. The reduced-form
specication (1) greatly simplies the analysis, while capturing key e¤ects also present in more complicated cases.
One can also relax it substantially, as discussed in Section 5.
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for external visibility.7
To analyze most transparently the interplay of individual and aggregate uncertainty over agents
preferences we focus on a single source of heterogeneity, namely intrinsic motivation. Thus all share
the same marginal valuation for money or other extrinsic incentives y, which is normalized to 1;
they also care equally about social (or self) esteem, as reected by a common :8
 Principal. Agents face a principal who sets the incentive y wage, tax or subsidy, sentence,
etc. This is the law, whether that of the company or that of the land.9 The principal may also
be able to communicate with agents directly, whether by disclosing hard information or through
cheap talk.10 We focus the exposition on the case of a planner who maximizes social welfare
W = U   (1 + )ya; (2)
where U is the sum, in equilibrium, of all agents utilitiesdened in (1), a their total contribution
and   0 the shadow cost of funds or other resources used as incentives deadweight loss from
taxes, enforcement costs, etc. This focus is without loss of generality, as a simple renormalization
maps the objective function of less benevolent or even purely selsh principals into (2).11
1.2 The calculus of esteem and the social multiplier
Let G(v) denote the distribution of agents intrinsic motivations, with nite support V 
[vmin; vmax]; continuously di¤erentiable density g(v) > 0; hazard rate h(v)  g(v)= (1 G(v)) and
7See Smith [1759], Bem [1972], Bodner and Prelec [2003], Bénabou and Tirole [2004, 2011]
8The specication (1) is thus a special case of the more general model (Bénabou and Tirole [a])
U = (va + vyy) a  C(a) + ea+ a E(vaja)  y E(vyja);
in which: (i) the action a can be discrete or continuous; (ii) agents can also have di¤erent marginal utilities of money vy;
(iii) it may be undesirable to be perceived as greedy or needy, as reected in the last term; (iv) agentsreputational
concerns can also di¤er, so that a type is a quadruplet (va; vy; a; y): At least two-dimensional heterogeneity is
required to generate a negative response to incentives (net crowding out), as well a related overjustication e¤ect
of publicity. We shall be abstracting here from these phenomena, to better focus on new ones, arising in particular
from aggregate uncertainty.
9We assume costless observation of behaviors by the principal and a well-understood notion of what constitutes
a good or bad action. Shavell (2002) argues that transaction costs and better local knowledge of situational factors
can make social norms preferable to legal enforcement. See also Fisher and Hudddart (2008) for a model with norms
and an informationally constrained principal.
10Another policy tool can be for the principal to a¤ect the public visibility or memorability of agentsactions, thus
scaling the reputational weight  (more generally, all the (a; y)s in footnote 8), by a factor x  0; at some cost
(x): Similarly, laws and public campaigns can also inuence behavior by causing people to pay more attention to
their actions and the image they will project. On the benets and costs of visibility-based policies, see Prat [2005],
Bénabou and Tirole [2006a], Daughety and Reinganum [2009], Bar-Isaac [2009] and Ali and Bénabou [2010].
11Let W =  U + [B   (1 + )y] a; where 0    1 and B represents any private benets derived from agents
participation or e¤ort. For the planner,  = 1 and B = 0; while a rm selshly maximizing prots has  = 0 < B:
Imperfectly benevolent principals government agency, NGO, church, etc. fall in-between. Clearly, by redening
agentsvalues as v0  v;C0  C; e0 = e+B and 0  1  +   0; this more general problem reduces to (2).
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mean v: We also dene two important conditional moments and their di¤erence:
M+(v)  E [~v j ~v > v] ; M  (v) = E [~v j ~v < v] ; (3)
(v)  M+(v) M (v); for all v 2 V: (4)
Given y; an agent chooses a = 1 if v  c   y    (E [~v j a = 1]  E [~v j a = 0])  v; dening a
cuto¤ rule. Conversely, in an interior equilibrium (on which we shall focus for simplicity),the two
conditional expectations are given byM+(v); which governs the honorconferred by participa-
tion, andM (v), which governs the stigmafrom abstention. In the self-image interpretation of
the model,M+(v) andM (v) correspond to virtue and guilt.
The net reputational incentive is (v); and the cuto¤ v solves the xed-point equation12
v   c+ y + (v) = 0: (5)
 The social multiplier. When more people do the right thing, or are thought to do so,
does the pressure on individuals to also choose a = 1 rise or fall? As v decreases (see Figure 1a),
honor declines but stigma worsens, since both M+and M  are increasing functions. Depending
on which e¤ect dominates, the net social or moral pressure (v) can decrease or increase. In the
rst case, 0(v) > 0 and decisions are (locally) strategic substitutes. In the latter case, 0(v) < 0;
they are (locally) strategic complements, which corresponds to the usual denition of a norm.
Figure 1a: preference distribution Figure 1b: reputational returns
If complementarity is strong enough and  high enough, there can be multiple equilibria that
is, self-sustaining norms. In this paper, however, we ensure uniqueness by imposing 1+0(v) > 0;
which holds for  not too large.13 The slope of aggregate supply a(y) = 1 G(v(y)) is then g(v)
12An interior equilibrium will be ensured by assuming (or, later on, ensuring that the optimal y satises) (1  
)vmin + v < c  y < (1 + )vmax   v; together with the condition stated below for monotonicity of v + (v):
13The fact that j0j is bounded is shown in the Appendix. Bénabou and Tirole [2006a] provide su¢ cient conditions
and explicit examples for the case of multiplicity, 1 + 0 < 0: Previous signaling models with a continuum of types
and potentially multiple equilibria include Bernheim [1994] and Rasmusen [1996]. For a model with complementarities
between non-reputational norms and incentives, see Weibull and Villa [2005].
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times the social multiplier,
  @v

@y
=
1
1 + 0(v)
: (6)
Intuition suggests that honor concerns will dominate when people who do the right thing
(a = 1) are fairly rare, and stigma considerations prevail when only a few deviantsfail to comply.
This is only true, however, under appropriate restrictions on the distribution of agentspreferences.
Lemma 1 (Jewitt 2004) If g is everywhere decreasing (increasing), then  is everywhere in-
creasing (decreasing). If g has a unique interior maximum, then  has a unique interior minimum.
We focus on the second case, which is more general as it allows for both strategic substitutability
and complementarity; see Figure 1b. For technical reasons, we impose on  a slightly stronger
version of the quasiconcavity in (2), by assuming that it is strictly decreasing everywhere to the
left of its minimum, and strictly increasing everywhere to the right. Note that this minimum does
not coincide (generically) with the mode of g:
For concreteness, we shall refer to the desiredbehavior a = 1 as being (in equilibrium):
Respectable or normal, if v is in the lower tail, for instance because the cost c is low.
These are things that everyone but the worst people do, such as not abusing ones spouse and
children, and which are consequently normative, in the usual sense that the pressure to conform
rises with their prevalence.
Admirableor heroic, if v is in the upper tail, for instance because the cost c is very high.
These are actions that only the best do, such as donating a kidney to a stranger or risking ones
life to rescue others.
Modalif v in the middle range around the minimum of : Both a = 1 and a = 0 are then
common behaviors, leading to weak inferences about agents types.14
It is worth noting that the model generates endogenously the two types of signaling motives
which, in the previous literature, were taken as alternative assumptions: a desire to signal confor-
mity (e.g., Bernheim [1994]), and a desire to signal distinction (e.g., Pesendorfer [1995]).15
Crowding in and out. Because they (partially) crowd out social esteem, material incentives,
laws, nes and prizes are not very e¤ective means to spur admirable, honor-driven behaviors such
as military valor, or risking ones life to save someone elses : the multiplier is less than 1:16
Incentives are much more e¤ective (multiplier exceeding 1) for respectable behaviors, such as tax
compliance, as they are amplied by the dynamics of stigma (partial crowding in). Where net costs
14Other factors a¤ecting the relative strength of honor and stigma include nonlinearities in reputational payo¤s,
E ['(v) j a] (e.g., Corneo [1997]) and di¤erential visibility of good and bad deeds (Bénabou and Tirole [2006a]).
15See also Brennan and Brooks [2007], who do not formulate a signaling model but postulate, based on intuition,
that the interplay of esteem and disesteem should lead to a net reputational value that is U-shaped with respect
to the rate of compliance. We prove such a result, which holds provided the distribution of types is well behaved
(unimodal).
16Full crowding out (a negative supply response to incentives, or multiplier) requires multidimensional heterogeneity,
as described in footnote 8. This phenomenon was investigated elsewhere and is therefore not our focus here.
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are not too high (a moderately low v) and actions easily observable (a high ); small variations in
incentives can induce large changes in aggregate behavior.17
 Shifts in societal preferences. A key focus of the paper are situations in which there may
be aggregate shifts in the distribution of agentspreferences. For any  2 R; let
G(v)  G(v   ) (7)
be the original distribution shifted to the right by ; with density g(v) = g(v  ) and hazard rate
h dened similarly. We assume from here on that individualsprivate valuations are distributed
according to G(v) on the support V  [vmin + ; vmax + ]; where community standards may
be known or a priori uncertain. Conditionally on ; the reputational return to choosing a = 1
is easily seen to be (v)  (v   ): Without loss of generality we normalize the vs (adding a
constant) so that the minimum of  occurs at v = 0; and that of  therefore at v = : To insure
that the equilibrium cuto¤ is always interior (and, a bit more strictly, participation bounded away
from 0 and 1), we then restrict the models parameters to satisfy
vmin +  + " < c  e < vmax +    " (8)
for some xed but arbitrarily small " > 0: Equivalently the support of  lies in   [c  e  vmax +
"; c  e  vmin   "]:18
For known  the whole model remains unchanged, with all variables simply indexed by  : the
cuto¤, v(y); is still given by (5) and the multiplier by (6), with  in place of ; implying
v(y)   = v(y + ); 8 y; : (9)
A known shift in societal preferences  therefore has the same e¤ect on (equilibrium) social norms
(v

(y)) and aggregate behavior a(y) as an increase in material incentives y of the same mag-
nitude. This equivalence already suggests that, for a principal, communicating about community
standards, or a rms culture, can be an attractive substitute to costly rewards and punishments
provided he can achieve credibility.
17A good example is Irelands 33c/ tax on plastic bags (instituted in conjunction with an awareness campaign):
Within weeks, plastic bag use dropped 94%. Within a year, nearly everyone had bought reusable cloth bags,
keeping them in o¢ ces and in the backs of cars. Plastic bags were not outlawed, but carrying them became socially
unacceptable on a par with wearing a fur coat or not cleaning up after ones dog. (Rosenthal [2008]). Other
examples include Continental Airlines$50 bonus program based on company-wide performance (Knez and Simester
[2001]) and the impact on voting turnout of (removing) symbolicnes for non-voters in Switzerland (Funk [2007]).
18Condition (8) means that it is socially ine¢ cient (respectively, e¢ cient) for the least (most) motivated agent,
with types close to vmin +  (close to vmax + ) to contribute. It will imply that for y close to the rst-best optimum
(which delivers v = c  e), the cuto¤ remains interior (i.e., the condition given in footnote 12 is satised).
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2 Optimal incentives with norms: symmetric information
Consider the problem of a social planner who sets the incentive y to maximize total welfare,
W = U   (1 + )ya. Each individual who contributes, at a cost of c; values doing so at v and
additionally generates an external benet e for society. He also receives y, but this costs (1 + )y
to provide, where   0 is the shadow cost of public funds. Finally, the contributor reaps the
reputational benet (v) but, image being a zero-sum game (or positional good), inicts an
equivalent reputational loss on non-contributors.19 Thus, social welfare is equal to
WFI (y) 
Z +1
v (y)
(e+ v   c  y) g(v)dv + v: (10)
In all that follows we assume this objective function to be strictly quasiconcave in y; for all ; such
is the case provided  is small enough. The optimal incentive is then given as the solution to
[e+ v(y)  c  y]
 @v(y)
@y

g(v

(y)) =  [1 G(v(y))] : (11)
The interpretation is familiar from Ramsey taxation: the net social marginal benet of raising y by
one dollar (inducing da = ( @v=@y) g new agents to participate) is equated to the deadweight
loss from paying the extra subsidy to all inframarginal agents.20 The condition can also be rewritten
so as to make clear role of the social multiplier in the participation response,
e+ v(y)  c  y
1 + 0(v

(y))
=

h(v

(y))
: (12)
The rst-best case of no distortion will prove to be an important benchmark under both symmetric
and asymmetric information. With  = 0; (12) simplies to e + v(y
FB()) = c; which is the
standard Samuelson condition equating the total social benet and cost of a marginal contribution.
Proposition 1 (modied Pigou) The rst-best (symmetric information,  = 0) incentive is
yFB() = e  (c  e) = e  (c  e  ): (13)
When g is strictly unimodal in v; yFB is single-peaked with respect to  and c; and maximized at
0  c  e:
19 Computing agentsaverage utility U; esteem and stigma sum up to (1 G(v))M+(v) +G(v)M (v) = v: If
reputational payo¤s are nonlinear, or if  varies with v; signaling can be a positive or negative-sum game, depending in
particular on the curvature of probability functionals. The linear case serves as a natural and important benchmark,
and also avoids philosophicaldebates on whether or not esteem and stigma, or pride and shame, should be counted
as part of social welfare.
20Dening the elasticity "(y)  ya0(y)=a(y), (12) can be rewritten in the Lerner-Ramsey form (e^  y) =y =
(=1 + ) (1="(y)) ; where e^  (e  )=(1 + ) is the net externality, scaled in monetary units.
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One must subtract from the standard Pigovian subsidy; e; the reputational rent extracted by a
marginal contributor from the rest of society. Otherwise choosing a = 1 would be overcompensated,
and conversely noncompliers would su¤er an excessive double whammy. This reputation tax
makes yFB dependent, in a nonmonotonic way, on  and c; see the top curve in Figure 2. When  is
low or c high, most people do not contribute, so the few who do reap signicant honor. Conversely,
when  is high relative to c, the few bad appleswho fail to participate incur strong stigma. At
both ends there is thus a strong reputational incentive, making a low y optimal. When  is close
to 0; on the other hand, social pressure is at its weakest contributing and abstaining are both
commonrequiring higher incentives.21
 Implications.
(i) The tax deduction rate for charitable donations should be lower than the standard Pigovian
level and, most importantly, vary inversely with the publicity or image value inherent to the gift.
While implementing such a scheme in practice may not be easy, there are, for instance, well es-
tablished market pricesfor naming rights to a university or hospital building, an endowed chair,
etc. Similarly, agencies rating corporations on their social responsibility could aim to incorporate
a publicity discount in their scores. Indeed, the purpose of such evaluations is to measure true
contributions to social welfare and even, through the response of some market participants, reward
or punish corporations accordingly.22
(ii) Similar distortions toward the more visible (high ) occur on the consumer side: the
premium paid for fair tradeor greenproducts also buys social and self image, the ip side of
which is the stigma (or bad conscience) shifted to others. As a result, too many dollars likely ow
toward hybrid cars and solar panels relative to housing insulation and e¢ cient furnaces (Ariely
[2008]), or toward free-trade co¤ee compared to food kitchens.
(iii) Consider a new environment-friendly technology that di¤uses more widely as its cost c falls,
due to technological progress. The optimal subsidy rate should rst rise, then fall over time.
In general, yFB could be positive or negative (taxing image-seeking behaviors with low or
negative social value). We shall assume from now on that
e > max f(vmin);(vmax)g = max fv   vmin; vmax   vg ; (14)
21This result has interesting parallels with Kaplow and Shavell [2007], who relate the optimal use of guilt and virtue
to the frequency of good or bad behavior. In their model, society has a costly inculcation technology for feelings
of guilt and virtue, which can be manipulated separately. In our model, guilt and virtue (M  and M+) arise in
equilibrium from everyones actions and inferences. This makes them interdependent, and vary with (control for)
the level of material incentives. The principal also has more limited ways of a¤ecting these feelings (or social payo¤s):
publicity x (which amplies them), or incentives y and messages about some society-wide variable ( or e), both of
which alter equilibrium inferences.
22One can think of agencies as reporting, and ethicalconsumers or investorss willingness to pay depending on,
the net social impact a [e  (v(y))  y(1 + )] or a rms actions, Alternatively, the information communicated
may be what is leaned about the rms (or its managements) intrinsic goodnessv, namely that it is above or below
a cuto¤ v(y) = c   y   (v(y)): In that case proper adjustment must also be made (when computing v(y)) for
the reputational benets reaped by the rm (which are no more observable to individuals than a or e):
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Figure 2: law and societal values
which ensures that yFB() > 0 for all ; since the function  is quasiconvex.
Turning back now to the more realistic second-best case where  > 0; but still with full infor-
mation about ; (12) implies
e+ v(y
SI()) > e+ v(y
SI())  ySI() > c: (15)
The social benet from the marginal contribution exceeds its social cost, implying that ySI() <
yFB(); see Figure 3, middle curve. Showing these results rigorously, however, requires solving a
system of implicit equations ((5) and (12)) in ySI() and v that can have singularity points. By
excluding some (arbitrarily small) interval around 0 = c  e and restricting attention to values of
 that are not too large, however, we can show:
Proposition 2 (modied Ramsey) Let (1; 2) be any subinterval of  not containing 0: For
all  below some  > 0 :
(i) The symmetric-information policy ySI() is uniquely dened on (1; 2) by (12) and it satises
0 < ySI() < yFB(): Compliance is thus lower than in the rst-best case.
(ii) The function ySI() is strictly increasing in  when 2 < 0; and strictly decreasing when
1 > 0:
These results demonstrate the robustness of the insights from the rst-best case reputation tax
and bell-shape of the optimal policy. Where the shadow cost  (economic, political) of providing
material incentives is high, however, compliance will fall substantially short of the rst best.23 In
such cases, other instruments may be more e¤ective.
23We show in Proposition 9. that yFI() is indeed decreasing in ; under an additional technical assumption.
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3 Persuasion and norms-based interventions
 Empirical evidence. While straight public appeals to good citizenship or generosity some-
times work fairly well (e.g., Reiss and White [2008] on electricity conservation during the California
energy crisis of 2000-2001), substantial evidence shows that they are much more e¤ective when
leveraged by social comparisons. The rst form this can take is making individual behavior more
observable to everyone (increasing ):24 The second, on which we shall focus here, consists in alter-
ing peoples perceptions of what constitutes normalbehavior or values in their reference group
(e.g., Cialdini [1984], Cialdini et al. [2006]). Two types of norms are distinguished in the social-
psychology literature and may be targeted in these interventions sometimes also called norms
marketing campaigns. The rst is the descriptive norm (the norm of is), namely what most
other people in your community actually do. The second is the prescriptive or injunctive norm
(the norm of ought): what most other people in your community approve of.
Schultz et al. [2007] thus monitored the electricity meters of 290 households, hanging each week
on their doors a visible feedback form with either: (i) the households own electricity consump-
tion and the average for comparable ones in their neighborhood; (ii) the same information, plus
a smiley face if they were below average, a frowning one if they were above. The descriptive
condition (i) led to a convergence toward the mean: high-consuming households adjusted down
but low-consuming ones adjusted up. In the descriptive + prescriptivecondition (ii), the latter
e¤ect disappeared, leading to a reduction in total consumption. Several electricity districts have
now adopted similar programs on a much larger scale. Ayres et al. [2010] study those of Sacra-
mento and Puget Sound (each with samples sizes of about 85; 000); implementing on consumers
monthly statements a scheme broadly similar to (ii) led to a rapid and lasting reduction in average
consumption, of about 2:5%:
Psychologistsview of how such interventions work is that: (i) people care strongly about social
comparisons and self approval, and judge what one should doby what they believe others do,
or approve of (that is, 0 < 0 , generating complementarity); (ii) they often misperceive the norm.
First, there is some dispersion in individual perceptions, which we shall relate to the convergence
e¤ect. Most importantly, there can be an aggregate misperception, termed pluralistic ignorance
(e.g., Miller and Prentice [1994a, 1994b]). People may have incorrect beliefs about how others
generally behave or assess their peers, or they may not properly account for the extent to which
others are also conforming to a commonly (mis)perceived norm.25 Dispelling excessive pessimism
can then (for 0 < 0) bring about a large and benecial shift in collective behavior, as found for
24For evidence, see e.g., Croson and [1998], Gerber et al. [2008], Ariely et al. [2009], Funk [2010], Della Vigna et
al. [2010], Kessler [2011] or Stocking [2011]. For an analysis of the benets and costs of such policies, see Bénabou
and Tirole [2006a], Daughety and Reinganum [2009] and Ali and Bénabou [2010].
25This is often seen as an instance of the fundamental attribution errorin which people systematically underesti-
mate the power of the situation. This idea is also related to those of social proof(Cialdini [1984]), and preference
falsication(Kuran [1995]). Psychologistsexplanation is thus implicitly or explicitly one of limited rationality, but
it does not have to be, as shown at the end of this section.
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instance by Prentice and Schroeder [1998] in the context of student drinking.26
Where pluralistic ignorance takes the form of excessive optimism about others conduct or
values, however, the truth will further damage compliance. For instance, in the case of pornography
which in US law is explicitly judged according to community standardsthere is denite evidence
that actual use vastly exceeds what people think.27 The same is likely true of drug use, and possibly
of racist and sexist attitudes. In an experiment on tax evasion and welfare fraud in three European
countries, Lefebvre et al. [2011] nd that revealing previous instances of low average compliance
increases evasion.28 The literatures standard recommendation is to use the descriptive norm (or
both) if most people behave well relative to general expectations, but if they behave badly use
only the prescriptive norm. There is, however a problem of long-run credibility (or legitimacy;
Tyler [1990], Xiao [2010]), as the principal experimenter, NGO, policymaker nds himself in
the position of selectively disclosing and framing good behaviors, eluding or minimizing depressing
truths, and relying on soft statements about what people declare they approve of, while doing
the opposite.29
 Formalizing norms-based interventions. Descriptive interventions correspond to com-
municating with agents about the average a, which in turn reects some preference parameter like
 that they are imperfectly informed about. Prescriptive interventions, from public campaigns to
individualized smiley faces, can be understood as communicating about e (people are strongly
a¤ected by this problem) or especially about  (people make strong judgments based on this
behavior), which boosts social pressure  both directly and, for respectable acts, indirectly:
@()=@ = =(1 + 0): As we show below, however, even a fully benevolent principal will
always try to exaggerate or selectively disclose positive information about a; ; e or : Agents, con-
versely, will discount such cheap talk, a fortiori when the norms entrepreneurcould be deriving
private benets from their compliance.
Let agents be only imperfectly informed about current community standards, namely the
overall behavior of the population against which theirs will be judged. Indeed, these shift with the
26Prentice and Miller [1993] showed that students overestimate the extent to which others approve of drinking, and
that this perceived tolerance by peers is a strong predictor of use. Prentice and Schroeder [1998] randomly treated
entering students with information dispelling the stereotype, and this led to signicantly lower reported levels of
consumption. Moreover, this e¤ect was mediated by studentsfear of negative evaluation, as assessed by an initial
psychological questionnaire. For similar ndings (over-pessimistic pluralistic ignorance, e¤ective intervention from
dispelling it) in the context of tax compliance, see Wenzel [2005].
27Richtel [2008] relates how the defense lawyer in a recent pornography trial sought to subpoena Google for data
on the frequency of sexual-term searches among internet users in the very town where the trial was held. Conversely,
the prosecutor fought hard (and prevailed) to block any such information from being provided to the jury.
28Revealing instances of high compliance, on the other hand, has no signicant e¤ect in their sample. This can be
explained by our model, given that tax compliance is arguably a respectable rather than a heroic behavior; gure 1b
and equation (6) then show that the social multiplier is large when the proportion of compliers is near the middle of
the respectable range, and decreases toward zero when it approaches 1.
29For experiments based on framing, see, e.g. Cialdini et al. [2003] or Goldstein et al. [2006]. Note also that the
truth about dominant behavior is likely to leak out over time (as occurred in Prentice and Schroeder [1998]), and
when the descriptive and injunctive norms visibly diverge, the former tends to trumps the latter (e.g., Tyran and
Feld [2006], Bicchieri and Xiao [2010]).
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underlying distribution of preferences in society, ; which is hard for an individual to observe.30
Agentsprior belief about  is that it lies in some interval [1; 2]  ; with distribution F (): The
legislator or principal may have information about  (or, equivalently, a), for instance from having
observed the behavior of a representative sample.31
The principal cannot or does not vary incentives (laws with expressive content will be studied
later on), so y is xed, possibly at zero, or more generally at a low enough level that
e > max fv   vmin; vmax   vg+ (1 + )y: (16)
This condition, reducing to (14) when y = 0; ensures that greater participation always raises social
welfare.32
We assume (as a simplication) that agentssocial payo¤s are based on long-run reputations,
namely those that will be assigned to contributors and non-contributors after  becomes publicly
known (which ultimately happens with probability 1) for instance, after everyone has had time to
observe average compliance, a: An agents action choice is then based on his expectation of those
nalreputation payo¤s conditionally on his own v; which is informative about  since it is drawn
from G: Formally, E[vja] is replaced in (1) by E[E[vja; ] j v]:
We restrict attention to equilibria in which each agents optimal strategy is a cuto¤ vF (y);
given that others follow the same rule.33 In such an equilibrium, the expected reputational return
for an agent with valuation v is E[(vF (y)   )j F; v]: We also focus on respectable behaviors,
meaning that the support of  lies to the right of 0 = c e: Strategic complementarity is indeed the
relevant case for most existing norm-based interventions, which typically involve relatively low-cost
behaviors (e.g., energy conservation).
 Non-strategic revelation. We rst investigate what occurs when the principal cannot
prevent the information from leaking, or it is exogenously revealed by some third party media,
academics, watchdogs, etc. Dene, for all v 2 V and distribution F describing agentsprior beliefs
about ; the operator
(v; F )  v   c+ y + E[(v   ) jF; v]: (17)
Since a higher v and a lower F both represent good news about  (in the sense of rst-order
stochastic dominance), and since 1 + 0 > 0 for all ;  is increasing in v and decreasing in F:
Under pluralistic ignorance the cuto¤ vF (y) is thus uniquely dened and, when interior, given as
30We model here descriptive interventions, but the prescriptive case could be treated very similarly.
31Examples include electricty consumption, recycling, tax compliance, etc. Ali and Bénabou (2010) analyze the
reverseproblem in which the principal seeks to learn about ; and it is the population who (at least in the aggregate)
has more information about it.
32 Indeed, in any equilibrium dened by a cuto¤ v, e is what a marginal contributor brings to society, whereas
E [(v
) j I]+(1+)y is what he costs society (what he must be given, plus the deadweight loss from the incentive),
where I is his information set ; recall, nally, that (v) < max fv   vmin; vmax   vg for all :
33For small enough  other types of equilibria can be ruled out, but in general they cannot: the expected reputational
return E[R j v]  E[E [~v j a = 1; ]  E [~v ja = 0; ] j v] need not be increasing in v; so the set of of contributors
fv j v   c+ y + E[R j v]  0g need not be an interval.
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the solution to (vF (y); F ) = 0: When  becomes known, it shifts to the familiar v

(y), which is
decreasing in :
Proposition 3 (non-strategic revelation) Let  have prior distribution F () on [1; 2]  
with 1 > 0: Compliance is a respectable act both prior to and following agentslearning  : 
0
 < 0
at both vF (y) and v

(y): Moreover,
(i) There exists a threshold ^ such that revelation increases compliance if  > b and decreases it if
 < b:
(ii) The higher is , that is, the better news it represents relative to the initial prior, the greater the
gain (or the lower the loss) in social welfare resulting from revelation.34
Proposition 3 characterizes the aggregate response to disclosure (which is of primary interest
to the policymaker), but in doing so it likely understates the extent of heterogeneity in individual
responses. In Schultz et al. [2007], for instance, providing comparative data on electricity use
led to a reduction for high consumers, but an increase for low consumers. The model provides
a natural mechanism for such convergence: with 0 < 0 (energy conservation is not a heroic
activity), individuals who nd out they had overestimated the social standard  feel decreased social
pressure to contribute, and those who had underestimated it, increased pressure. At the same time,
the dispelling of the average misperception, moving everyone in the same direction, implies that
convergence cannot be a general result, and is thus not to be expected in every experiment.35
 Strategic disclosure. Consider now a principal who has some control over what agents get
to learn. With probability q he receives (hard) information about ; he can then choose to reveal
it, or claim that he has no such data (which occurs with probability 1   q). Upon disclosure, the
cuto¤ for participation is again v(y): In the absence of disclosure it is v

~F
(y); dened by
(v~F (y);
~F ) = v~F (y)  c+ y + E[(v~F (y)  ) j ~F ; v~F (y))] = 0; (18)
where ~F () denotes the distribution of  conditional on non-disclosure. Given the above-noted
properties of ; (18) uniquely denes v~F (y) (when interior), and this cuto¤ is increasing in
~F :
Because greater participation always increase social welfare, the principal discloses if and only
if v(y)  v~F (y):36 Since v(y) is decreasing in ; this occurs for  greater than some threshold ~:
Given such a good news onlypolicy by the principal, nally, agentsposterior beliefs in case of
34The prior F represents agents(common) belief about  before each one learns his own v; drawn from G: Agents
beliefs at the interim stage where they know their own v are heterogenous, and also increasing (stochastically) in ;
thus in general it is uncertain whether a higher  also represents better news relative to these interim beliefs. Agents
participation threshold v~F is independent of ; however, and therefore so is
~:
35For instance, extending the model to three actions, a = 0; 1; 2; one can construct examples in which learning
 leads to convergence (adjustments occur from both a = 0 and a = 2 towards a = 1); or on the contrary causes
divergence (adjustments from a = 1 to both extremes).
36This is formally shown as part of the proof of Proposition 4.
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non-disclosure are
~F () = F~() 
8>>><>>>:
F ()
qF (e)+1 q for   e
F (e)+[F () F (e)](1 q)
qF (e)+1 q for   e:
: (19)
An equilibrium therefore corresponds to a ~ that solves the xed-point equation
v~(y) = v

F~
(y): (20)
Proposition 4 (strategic revelation) (i) The principal discloses good news and conceals bad
ones: there exists a cuto¤ ~ 2 (1; 2) such that disclosure occurs if and only if   ~:
(ii) In any stable equilibrium, there is more disclosure (~ decreases), the higher q is.
(iii) For   ~; the principal would have been strictly better o¤ under a commitment to disclose.
The second part of the proposition illustrates the credibility problem resulting from discretionary
disclosure. When   e; with probability q the principal has the information to prove it, so the
outcome is the same as under a commitment to disclose. With probability 1  q he does not have
such proof available, so agents beliefs are described by F~; which is dominated by F and thus
yields lower compliance, making the principal strictly worse o¤. Achieving or enhancing credibility
requires, as usual, some form of costly signaling, to which we shall turn in the next section.
 Pluralistic ignorance and social proof. In what precedes, the aggregate preference
shock  and average behavior a have the same informational content, so it is equivalent for the
principal to disclose one or the other, and important that agents do not observe a on their own (at
least, not as well as the principal). While such is indeed the case for behaviors such as electricity
consumption, air pollution or tax evasion, in other instances such as drinking by student peers,
shirking by co-workers or the expression of prejudice against women and minorities, people will
have frequent and fairly good observations of the norm. Part of the idea of pluralistic ignorance
however, is that social proof (equilibrium behavior a) can be a misleading guide to the true
underlying group preference (); because individuals have trouble parsing out the contribution of
perceived social pressure to the observed outcome.
There are two ways to accommodate this more resilientform of pluralistic ignorance. First,
both  and  may be subject to aggregate shocks, leading to a signal-extraction problem in in-
terpreting a:37 Alternatively, pooling can also make a imperfectly informative, thereby restoring
the scope for a principals disclosures (strategic or not) to a¤ect agentsperceptions of ; and
hence their behavior. For instance, relaxing the assumptions of continuously distributed  and
interior participation cuto¤, let  take value L or H ; such that: (i) when agents know that  = H
37This is done in Ali and Bénabou [2010], with agents receiving noisy idiosyncratic signals about both aggregate
shocks, from their own preferences.
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(respectively,  = L) there is positive participation, 0 < a  1 (respectively, zero participation;
a = 0); (ii) the prior probability that  = L is high enough that, when agents are uninformed,
no one contributing remains the (generically unique) equilibrium.38 Thus, pluralistic ignorance
prevails when agents observe a = 0; and dispelling it by (credibly) disclosing that  = H increases
participation.
4 The expressive function of law
4.1 Law and societal values
 Empirical evidence. The idea that the law is more than a set of prices but also serves to
convey a societys norms of behavior has long been discussed in the legal literature, albeit mostly
in the form of thought experiments and debates over the symbolic content of legislations on sexual
behavior, drinking or smoking in public, religious displays, ag-burning, etc. More recent work
brings two types of empirical evidence to bear on the issue.
The rst one documents the e¤ectiveness of symbolicnes or sanctions incentives too small
to matter through the standard price channel, but which signicantly raise compliance when com-
bined with a simple statement or reminder of ones moral duty. Funk (2007) shows that the repeal
of mandatory-voting laws in Switzerland led to statistically signicant declines in turnout in can-
tons where the law had stipulated a trivial ne (about 1 Euro) for non-voters, whereas it had no
impact where the mandate was purely declarative. Similar results are demonstrated by Galbiati
and Vertova (2008) in a public-goods experiment. Stating an obligationto contribute above some
minimum has only a weak e¤ect, and non-binding incentives (nes small enough that complete
free-riding remains a dominant strategy for material payo¤s) have none. When the two are com-
bined, however, contributions double, and about half of this impact operates through a shift in
subjectsbeliefs about what others will give.
These ndings suggest a signaling role of incentives (at least as perceived by subjects), and a
second set of papers specically document such a mechanism. Tyran and Feld (2006) show that
mild lawpenalties insu¢ cient to deter free-ridinghas no e¤ect when it is exogenously imposed
in a public-goods game, but signicantly raises compliance when endogenously chosen through
an initial vote by the participants. Belief change is again a key element, as more votes favoring
mild sanctions lead agents to expect higher compliance by others, and these expectations largely
explain contributions levels (between conditions and subjects). In Galbiati et al. (2010), a pair
of players engaged in a coordination (minimum-e¤ort) game may be provided with substantial
incentives. When these are exogenously imposed by the experimenter, they lead to increased
e¤ort and expectations that the partner will also respond by contributing more. When they are
endogenously imposed by a benevolent third party who has observed the pairs behavior in a
previous round, in contrast, subjects who had provided high e¤ort become pessimistic about their
38When dealing with corner equilbria, we restrict attention to those satisfying the D1 criterion.
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partners contribution and accordingly reduce their own, making the sanctions counterproductive.39
Bremzeny et al. [2011] also test and conrm the bad news e¤ectsof choosing strong incentives,
this time in a setting where the principal has private information about the di¢ culty of the (single)
agents task.
Modeling expressive law. In what follows, we formalize the expressive content of (optimal)
incentives in the presence of norms, or reputational payo¤s more generally. We investigate in
particular a question on which neither the legal literature nor existing experiments o¤er consistent
insights: when should expressive concerns make the law milder, or on the contrary tougher?
When a legislator or principal with privileged information about community standards 
or compliance a sets material incentives law, rewards, penalties these will inevitably convey
a message about those standards, and thereby shape agents understanding of prevailing social
norms. Formally, the model will now involve two-sided signaling: agents signal their idiosyncratic
types,while the principal signals the aggregate state of societal preferences.40
For simplicity, let  be perfectly known by the principal.41 Agents only know that it lies in some
subinterval (1; 2) of  with 1 > 0 (a = 1 is then a respectablebehavior); or, alternatively,
that it lies in some (1; 2)   with 2 < 0 (admirablebehavior). Technically, this one-sided-
supportrestriction is made necessary by the non-monotonic nature of the policy under symmetric
information, which implies that a separating equilibrium cannot exist over all :
We look for a separating equilibrium where the planners policy yAI() is strictly increasing on
 if that interval lies to the left of 0; and strictly decreasing if it lies to the right. Agents can
then invert the policy and infer the true  as the unique solution ^(y) 2  to yAI(^(y))  y: The
resulting cuto¤ (here again assumed interior) is then v
^(y)
(y); so the planner maximizes42
WAI (y) 
Z +1
v
^(y)
(y)
(e  y + v   c) g(v)dv + (v + ): (21)
Provided WAI is quasiconcave in y for all  and  (which holds for  small enough), the optimum
39The source of complementarity is here the nature of agentspayo¤s, whereas in our model it is the reputation-
based social norm (when 0 < 0). The common and key elements are the choice of incentives by an informed
principal and agentsinferences from it about how others are likely to act.
40As in Bénabou and Tirole [2003], Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008] and Herold [2010] there is an informed-
principal problem, but now the feature of the taskwhich agents try to infer the social pressure (v)embodies
everyones equilibrium actions and beliefs. In Sliwka [2008] and van der Weele [2008] incentives also convey information
about the distribution of preferences but the nature of normative inuences is quite di¤erent. In Sliwka [2008] social
complementarities operate through conformist types, whose preference is to mimic whatever action the majority
chooses. In van der Weele [2008] they involve reciprocal altruists, whose taste for contributing to a public good rises
with aggregate contributions (v is increasing in a): Our model has no built-in complementarity; conformity (0 < 0)
or distinction (0 > 0) e¤ects arise endogenously, and we analyze expressive law in both cases.
41The main simplication is that, in a separating equilibrium, agents will not use their own realizations of ~v to
make inferences about ; since it is fully revealed by y:
42We continue to assume that reputations (being long-term objects), are consumed ex-post, once agents have
learned the true  from, say, observing a. This is why the last term is (v + ), rather than (v + ^(y)):
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is given, on each side of 0; by the rst-order condition 
e  c  y + v
^(y)
(y))
1 + 0
^(y)
(v
^(y)
(y))
!
1  0
^(y)
(v
^(y)
(y))) ^
0
(y)

=

h(v

^(y)
(y))
: (22)
Together with the equilibrium condition ^ = (yAI) 1; this denes a rst-order di¤erential equation
in yAI() : 
e  c  yAI() + v(yAI())
1 + 0(v

(y
AI()))

1  
0
(v

(y
AI()))
(yAI)0()

=

h(v

(y
AI()))
: (23)
The di¤erence with (12) reects the planners taking into account that agents will draw inferences
from his policy about where societal values lie (term ^
0
= 1=yAI0) and the social sanctions and
rewards they will face as a result (term 0(v

)). This informational multiplier, 1   0^
0
, em-
bodying the expressive content of the law, combines with the previously analyzed social multiplier,
1=(1 + 0); to amplify or dampen agentsresponse to incentives, and therefore the optimal level
of y: Once again, the case of no deadweight loss provides a useful benchmark.
Proposition 5 For  = 0; the rst-best symmetric-information solution yFB() = e  (c  e)
remains an equilibrium on (1; 2); and it is the unique separating one.
Intuitively, when the rst-best can be achieved with non-distortionary incentives there is no
need to resort to the norm as a substitute, and hence no need either for any expressiveness in
the law designed to manipulate that norm. The more realistic case  > 0 requires solving the
di¤erential equation (23), with yAI = ySI at the inner boundary. Because the Lipschitz conditions
do not hold everywhere, we need to again take  to be relatively small and impose the support
restriction on  described above.
Lemma 1 Let (1; 2) be any subinterval of  with 1 > 0 (respectively, 2 < 0). For all  below
some  > 0; the di¤erential equation (23) with boundary condition yAI(1) = ySI(1) (respectively,
yAI(2) = y
SI(2)) has a unique solution on (1; 2):
In the process of proving existence and uniqueness we also establish the following key properties
of the equilibrium policy, illustrated on Figure 2 (bottom curve).
Proposition 6 (law expressing societal standards) (i) For all  below some  > 0; the equi-
librium incentive yAI() is strictly positive, increasing to the left of 0, and decreasing to its right.
(ii) Whether the prosocial action is respectable or admirable (1 > 0 or 2 < 0); the princi-
pal always sets lower-powered incentives under asymmetric information, yAI() < y

FI() for all
 2 (1; 2); and compliance is lower.
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For a respectable activity, a lower y credibly conveys the message: everyone does it, except the
most disreputable people, who su¤er great stigma; this is why we do not need to provide strong in-
centives. For an admirable activity, a lower y conveys the message the glory su¢ ces: contributors
are rare heroes, who reap such social esteem that additional incentives are unnecessary. Another
interesting implication is that expressive law is more responsive to changes in societal values than
standardlaw, at least on average, and especially for modal acts, where both are used the most:
on both sides of 0; yAI and ySI start from a common value but yAI is everywhere below, so its
average slope is steeper. At the initial point, in particular, yAI0() =  1; so clearly this function
has (much) greater slope in a neighborhood of 1 and 2:43
4.2 Spillovers across spheres of behavior
What people learn or perceive concerning othersdegree of prosociality or selshness carries over
between activities, leading to spillovers in behavior, both good and bad.44 Given such contagion,
a principal setting law or other incentives for one activity needs to take into account how this
will a¤ect peoples views of general societal norms, and thus their behavior in other realms. For
instance, hard incentives conveying the sense that society is rotten(e.g., endemic corruption or
tax evasion) can be damaging in the case of case of respectable activities where 0 < 0:
A simple case will convey the main insight, but it can be substantially generalized. Agents
engage in two activities, a and b; both involving 0-1 decisions:
(i) Informal interactions. An individuals a behavior is observed by other private citizens,
giving rise to social sanctions and rewards, but not veriable by the government (or other principal),
who therefore cannot use incentives: cooperating with others, helping, contributing to public goods,
refraining from rent-seeking, etc. Formally, ya = 0 and a =  > 0:
(ii) Formal interactions. An individuals b behavior, conversely, is observed and veriable
by the principal or government, but not by other private citizens. Transactions between agents
and principal are of this nature, such as paying or evading taxes, an employees productivity or a
civil servants record of corruption complaints, etc. Other agents may also be less able than the
principal to sort through excuses for bad behavior (e.g., was the claimed tax deduction justied or
not)? Formally, yb = y > 0 and b = 0:
For simplicity, let the same intrinsic preferences a general degree of prosocialitydrive both ac-
tivities: va = vb = v:More generally, it su¢ ces that the two values or even just their distributions
be correlated. An agent chooses b = 1 if v   cb + y  0; or equivalently v  cb   y  vb (y): He
43Setting  = 1 (say) in (23) and using the fact that yAI(1)  ySI(1), which satises (12), implies that
0(v
(yAI1 (1)))=(y
AI)0(1) = 0: Since the numerator is strictly negative, the denominator must be innite.
44For instance, Keizer et al. (2008) posted yers (advertisements) on 77 bicycles parked along a wall and observed
that the fraction of owners tossing them on the ground doubled (from one third to two thirds) after gra¢ ti had been
painted on the wall. Similarly, leaving a e 5 bill sticking out of someones mailbox, they observed that 13% of people
pocketed it when the surroundings were clean, but 23% did when there was trash lying around.
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chooses a = 1 if v  va(y); dened by :
va(y)  ca + ^(y)(va(y)) = 0: (24)
Note that va depends on y (which only incentivizes b behavior) solely through the inferences drawn
about : The government or principal maximizes
WAI (y) =
Z +1
vb (y)
(eb + v   cb   y) g(v)dv +
Z +1
va(y)
(ea + v   ca) g(v)dv + (v + ); (25)
leading to the rst-order-condition:
@WAI (y)
@y
= (eb + v

b (y)  cb   y) g(vb (y))   [1 G(vb (y)]
  (ea   ca + va(y)) g(va(y))

@va(y)
@y

: (26)
Under symmetric information the last term vanishes, so the rst-best ( = 0) policy is given by
vb (y) = cb   eb; hence yFB  eb for all : When  > 0; the Ramsey condition takes the form
ySI() =
eb
1 + 
  
(1 + )h(vb (ySI())  )
: (27)
which has a unique solution 0 < ySI() < yFB()=(1 + ); decreasing in  and ; as long as
the hazard rate h(v) is increasing and 0 <  < h (vb (0)  ) eb: We shall assume both of these
conditions.
Under asymmetric information the social cost of a marginal rise in y now includes, on top of the
usual rents to inframarginal agents choosing b = 1; a reduction in a that arises from agentsinferring
that they face a worsesociety and therefore weaker social enforcement in their a decisions. The
optimal policy, taking account of these expressive spillovers, is given by yAI = ^
 1
; where ^ solves
the di¤erential equation
eb   (1 + )y = 
h^(y)(v

b (y))
+ (ea   ca + va(y))
 
g^(y)(v

a(y))
g^(y)(v

b (y)
!0@ ^0(y)  0^(y)(va(y))
1 + 0
^(y)
(va(y))
1A (28)
with boundary condition ^
 
ySI(1)

= 1: For simplicity we focus on the case where, under
symmetric-information, the a activity is in the respectable range, 0(v

a(y
SI())) < 0; and rep-
utational pressure is insu¢ cient to ensure the rst-best, meaning that va(ySI()) > ca   ea: The
latter condition is ensured as long as ea satises (14), and the former provided that  has support
in some (1; 2)   with 1 > ea   eb   (0); and  is not too large.45
45 Indeed, va(y
SI()) <  if   ca+ySI()+() > 0; recall that () = (0); while for  small enough ySI()
is close to yFB() = eb:
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Proposition 7 (expressive spillovers) When the socially-enforced behavior a is respectable or
admirable (1 > 0); the principal sets lower-powered incentives for the incentivized action b under
asymmetric information: yAI() < ySI() for all ; with yAI() decreasing everywhere. Participa-
tion in b is lower than under full information, participation in a is unchanged (since  is revealed).
These results are reminiscent of those in the multi-tasking literature, but operate through a dif-
ferent mechanism. The literature has emphasized the hazards associated with giving incentives in
one task when they cannot also be adjusted on another, competing one. Relatedly, when some as-
pects of performance are unveriable, it may be desirable to leave other, veriable ones, unspecied
(see, e.g., Baker et al. (1994), Bernheim and Whinston (1998)). Rather than e¤ort substitution,
crowding out occurs in our case through what incentives reveal about the standards of behavior to
be expected in other activities.
 Societys resistance to economistsprescriptions. In nearly all countries, economists
typical message about the e¤ectiveness and desirable normative properties of incentives meets with
considerable resistance. Examples includes tradeable pollution permits, nancial incentives for stu-
dents, teachers and civil servants, unemployment benets that decrease over time to encourage job
search, layo¤ taxes rather than regulation, markets for blood and organs, taxes rather than pro-
hibition for drugs and prostitution, etc. While misinformation and special-interest considerations
may be relevant in some cases, they do not come close to explaining the nearly universal reluctance
toward what many in the lay public perceive as a nefarious commodicationof human activity.
Our framework can be used to shed some light on this phenomenon. Economists typically bring
a message, both positive (based on empirical studies) and normative (policy recommendations)
that is bad news about human nature and behavior. In terms of the model, policies implementing
the standard advice to put a price on everything constitute strong public signals (and daily
reminders) that altruism is generally low (a low ), and greed generally high.46 Society may then
resist such a message and the policies embodying it, for two reasons.
First, individuals and societies alike often just do not like to hear bad news, preferring to
maintain pleasant (but ultimately, costly) illusions about themselves. Such is the case, for instance,
with political and economic ideologies, national founding myths, etc.47 A related form of purely
a¤ect-driven preference for collective self-image will be analyzed in the next section.
Second, societies could be justiably concerned about spillovers from policies that express too
dim or mercantile a view of human nature. For instance, economistslessons may be drawn pre-
dominantly from b -type behaviors, where incentives are easily available and social norms weak.
Less attention might be paid perhaps simply for lack of data to a -type behaviors, in which
incentives are unavailable and reliance on social norms important.48 As shown above, in such cases
46See footnote 8 for a more general version of the model in which agents di¤er in their marginal utility of money
vy: The distribution of vy can then also be subject to aggregate uncertainty, and thus revealed by policy.
47 For models of the persistence of collective ideologies through (equilibrium) cognitive dissonance, see Bénabou
and Tirole [2006b] and Bénabou [2008].
48Note the striking contrast between economiststypical ndings and message to society of  and  are lower than
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bringing bad news about ; by stating and especially by concretely signaling that strong incentives
are e¤ective or needed in b, has the collateral e¤ect of undermining the social norms in a: This
creates a need for incentives to replace them, but the nature of the activity can make this a much
less cost-e¤ective way of achieving compliance, resulting in a welfare loss.
4.3 When expressiveness makes law tougher
We have so far seen how expressive concerns about the nature of society (others goodness
or mediocrity) always makes, perhaps surprisingly, the law more gentle. So when do signaling
considerations lead instead to stronger incentives (along the lines of lock them up and throw away
the key: we need to send a message)?
Intuition suggests that this should occur when uncertainty bears on how damageable to society
selsh behavior is or, conversely, on how important the social spillovers (e) from good behavior
are. Also required, however, are preferences linking agentsintrinsic motivations, v, to the social
value of their contribution, e:49 Since such a link does seem intuitive, we now consider a variant
of the model in which intrinsic utilities are va = ve; with v  G(v) and G() having the same
properties as before.50 Reputation (or self-image) still bears on v; which represents an agents
general degree of social concern. Agents know their own v; while the principal knows e e.g., how
damaging to the environment CO2 emissions are, how much good $1 can do in poor countries, the
negative externalities created by drunk driving, drugs, etc.
Under symmetric information, the cuto¤ is now given by eve(y) c+y+(ve(y))  0; leading
again to a modied version of Pigovian taxation. Thus, for  = 0;
yFB(e) = e   ((c  e) =e) : (29)
In general, it could be the case that yFB < 0 (people demonstrate great social concern by paying
signicant costs for trivially small social benets), or that dyFB=de < 0 (reputation increases more
than 1 for 1 with e, hence also the reputation tax). We shall abstract from such cases, as we are
interested in relatively large es.51
Under asymmetric information we look for a separating equilibrium on the support [e1; e2] of
e such that yAI(e) is increasing everywhere, as are yFB(e) and ySI(e): Agents then infer e as the
solution to yAI(e^(y))  y, so the participation cuto¤ is ve^(y)(y); with
most people think, leading to a prescription for incentives; and those of social psychologists working on norms-based
interventions, which are that  and  are higher than most people think(pessimistic pluralistic ignorance).
49Otherwise, learning from y that e is high (say) has no impact on the reputational pressure  that agents face;
once the direct impact of y on v is accounted for; see (5).
50 In small-group interactions, such a link is consistent with (and follows from) pure, consequentialist altruism: an
individual values the di¤erence he makes to ea: With large numbers, it is not, since each individual has a negligible
e¤ect. Intrinsic motivation must then arise from a pure preference for (joy of) giving. Nonetheless, it remains
sensible that one should derive more intrinsic utility from giving to more useful causes, rather than unimportant
ones. In particular, this is what will arise from a Kantian-type or similar rule-based reasoning.
51Thus (14) su¢ ces to ensure yFB > 0 and , since 0 is bounded, a low enough  ensures that dyFB=de > 0: For
 small enough, these properties remain true for the full information second-best policy, yFI(e):
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Figure 3: law and social externalities
dve^(y)(y)
dy
=  
1 + ve^(y)(y)e^
0(y)
e^(y) + 0(ve^(y)(y))
: (30)
Knowing this, the principal maximizes
WAIe (y) =
Z +1
v
e^(y)
(y)
(e+ ev   c  y) g(v)dv + v;
leading to the di¤erential equation in e^(y)0@e
h
1 + ve^(y)(y)
i
  c  y
e^(y) + 0(ve^(y)(y))
1Ah1 + ve^(y)(y)e^0(y)i = h(ve^(y)(y)) (31)
or, conversely, in yAI(e) : 
e

1 + ve(y
AI(e))
  c  yAI(e)
e+ 0(ve(yAI(e)))
!
1 +
ve(y)
yAI0(e)

=

h(ve(yAI(e)))
; (32)
with boundary condition yAI(e1) = ySI(e1): Since ySI(e) is increasing we expect that for  small, so
is yAI(e); implying that the expressiveterm ve^(y)(y) e^
0(y) has the sign opposite to that obtained
in (22) for signaling over : These intuitions lead to the following results, illustrated in Figure 3.
Proposition 8 (law expressing externalities) Whether the prosocial action is respectable or
admirable, for all  > 0 below some  > 0; the principal sets higher-powered incentives under
asymmetric information: yAI(e) > ySI(e) for all e; and participation is correspondingly higher.
The function yAI(e) is everywhere increasing on [e1; e2]:
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4.4 Cruel and unusual punishments
As legal sanctions for antisocial behavior (harm to others, negative externalities), standard
social-welfare considerations generally argue for using nes, compensation of victims, community
service and other e¢ cient punishments. Such alternatives are, however, politically unpopular:
large fractions of the electorate demand not only long and harsh prison sentences but also various
forms of public humiliation.52 In many countries, public executions and corporal punishments are
still the law of the land and, when public, heavily attended.53 At the same time, a growing number
of nations are renouncing what they deem cruel and unusualpunishments or means of coercion.54
Such decisions, moreover, are not based on any real considerations of optimal deterrence, but on
what it makes us, what civilizedpeoples do or dont do in other words, on expressive reasons.
What exactly is it, however, that makes caning, whipping, ogging, public shaming and the
like qualitatively di¤erent and expressivelyworse than very long prison sentences or drastic
nancial penalties, especially when the condemned himself would rather take the pain or shame?
The key variable in the answer we develop here could be called the banality of evil: a fraction
 (for cruel) of agents in society actually enjoy the su¤ering of others (either all others, or only the
guilty, in which case this is a taste for vengeance). Seeing criminals, cheaters and other law-breakers
punished harshly a high level of physical or psychological pain, pand publicly (being a spectator
enhances this form of consumption) is an opportunity, and possibly an excuse, to obtain such
enjoyment. The total utility ow thus derived is then pG (v(p)), where v(p) is the threshold
below which people break the law and are subject (with some probability) to the punishment p:
The second important assumption is that many people do not like to think nd scary, disturbing
to acknowledgethat their society or community comprises a lot of cruel or vengeful types. These
could, for instance, hurt them in certain circumstances (tra¢ c dispute, breakdown of law and
order, etc.). Bad news about human nature is also, inevitably, bad news about oneself. We shall
assume here a simple (linear) a¤ective dislike for ugly truths about the banality of evil: agents
utility functions are now U  E [ j p] ; with U still given by (1) and  measuring the intensity of
preferences over beliefs about  2 [1; 2]:55
The government or legislator knows more about  having access to observations from the
judicial system, prison life, how people behave in blackouts, wars, etc. With such knowledge it sets
the level p = p() of painfulpenalties levied on those who choose a = 0 in serious o¤ences such
52See, e.g., Kahan [1996, 1998] who argues that alternative sentences (e.g., community service) are seen by the
public as not carrying appropriate symbolism conferring insu¢ cient stigma on the condemned and devaluing victims
whereas shaming sanctions, such as practiced in several U.S. states (internet postings, compulsory lawn signs, license
plates, etc.) better satisfy this demand.
53To take only a rich and educated country as an example, Singaporean law allows caning for over 30 o¤ences and
makes it mandatory punishment for several, such as rape or drug tra¢ cking. In 2007 there were 6,404 such sentences.
Caning is also used in prisons, the military, and schools.
54For instance, the European Community makes renouncing the death penalty a precondition for membership, and
the United States declares (with some debate over exceptions) torture contrary to American values.
55Alternatively, one could endogenize the presence of such a term in the principals objective function from instru-
mental concerns, arising for instance from coordination externalities in investment.
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as murder, theft, fraud, drunk driving, child abuse, etc. We make p here the only policy tool, but
one could also allow for non-cruel incentives y such as nes, jail time, community service, etc.
The key points should be unchanged, as these do not generate as much enjoyment for cruel types,
and are also more costly. In setting policy, let 0 <   1 be the weight placed on the utility of the
cruel types or equivalently, their political inuence.56 Finally, the iniction of harsh punishments
involves direct enforcement costs, represented by a unit shadow cost   0:
Given a level of harshness p; agents infer  as the solution ^(p) to p(^(p)) = p: The cuto¤
between law-abiding and law-breaking is then determined by v(p)   c + p + (v(p)) = 0; and
the planner maximizes
WAI (p) =
Z +1
v(p)
(e+ v   c) g(v)dv + (v + )  p (  )G (v(p))  ^(p): (33)
The combined optimality and equilibrium conditions now yield
e  c+ v(p) + p (  )
1 + 0(v(p))

g(v(p)) = (  )G(v(p)) + ^0(p): (34)
Under symmetric information, or in the absence of expressive considerations ( = 0); we get back
the case of Section 4.1, with 0     : Under asymmetric information, pAI() is given by (34)
with the boundary condition pAI(1) = pFI(1):
Proposition 9 (civilized punishments) Let eg(c  e)=G(c  e) < 1: For all  below some  >
0 and all  such that j  j is below some  > 0;
(i) The symmetric-information policy pFI() and its asymmetric-information counterpart pAI()
are both increasing in :
(ii) Punishments are less harsh under asymmetric information than under full information:
pAI() < pFI() for all  2 (1; 2]; and compliance is correspondingly lower.
Implications. The presence of -types reduces the e¤ective deadweight loss from punishment (to
the extent that society internalizes their utility), from  to   : This implies harsher sanctions,
closer to or in excess of rst-best deterrence level ( = 0): On the other hand, peoples desire to
believe, or signify to the world, that they are part of a non-barbaric society leads to restrictions
on cruel punishments, whether or not e¢ cient at the margin (above or below the rst-best). This
is captured by the last term in (34), which distinguishes such punishments from standard incen-
tives. To the extent that cruel typesenjoyment is enhanced by witnessing harsh treatments being
administered, expressive concerns will also and rst of alllead to eliminating public displays of
judicially sanctioned pain and executions. Indeed, much of what goes on in prisons is more cruel
than some forms of corporal punishments or public shaming, but it remains out of sight.57
56Equivalently, uncertainty could be over the political weight  of cruel types, rather than their number : Only
the product  matters.
57Note also that here as in previous cases the equilibrium is separating, so ultimately no one is fooled and
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5 Robustness and extensions
 Action space. The zero-one assumption yields very sharp results concerning the shape or
equilibrium reputations and optimal incentives. The underlying insights are much more general,
however. With several discrete actions, for instance, there will be multiple reputation levels cor-
responding to successive intervals of v; but the pursuit of reputation will remain a zero-sum gam
and be reected in a nonlinear tax embodied in the optimal incentive. Reputation levels will again
change with shifts in the distribution of preferences, leading to a scope for norm manipulation and
expressive law. In particular, whenever the principal has private information about any parameter
directly a¤ecting equilibrium reputations he will weaken incentives, so as to economize on their
cost, by signaling that social payo¤s are high. This remains true even with continuous actions,
as long as preference heterogeneity is multidimensional (e.g., prosocial motivation and utility for
money, or prosocial motivation and image concerns), so that behavior remains an imperfect signal
of type.58
 Reputational payo¤s. Most of the papers results were derived under the joint assumption
that types are distributed according to a single-peaked (possibly monotonic) density and that
reputational payo¤s are linear in the posterior belief about v: This is a natural benchmark, but the
results can be substantially generalized. Thus, if reputational payo¤s are of the form E['(v)ja];
where ' is increasing and di¤erentiable, this operates much as a change in the distribution of v 
more specically, in its skewness. Let w  '(v); which has c.d.f. F  G  ' 1 and associated
density f; and denote F (w) = M+F (w)  M F (w) the associated linear reputational payo¤.
The equilibrium cuto¤ is now given by v   c + y + F ('(v)) = 0; and the social multiplier
equals [1 + 0F (w
)'0(w)] 1 : Actions are therefore strategic complements when F is concave (f
is decreasing), which by denition means that G is more concave than ' (e.g., g is decreasing
and ' is convex). Conversely, they are strategic substitutes when G is more convex than ':
Similarly, f is single-peaked if G is more convex than ' up to a point, then more concave.59 The
analysis of optimal incentives under symmetric or asymmetric information then proceeds along lines
qualitatively similar to those of the paper, albeit with more complicated expressions.
These observations allow the global monotonicity or single-peakedness of equilibrium reputa-
tion and optimal incentives to be preserved for certain more general payo¤ specications. Even
when they are not, however, it is important to note that the papers key results do not strictly
average welfare would be higher (more generally, the principal would be better o¤ ex-ante) if he could commit to
acting according to the truth, whether pleasant or not, about human nature. This is a standard type of ine¢ cient-
signaling result, but it also reects specic assumptions that one may want to relax. Thus, with discrete types there
could be pooling equilibria; ignorance could then generate (ex-ante) welfare gains if agentsutility is concave in ^;
or if increasing returns in cooperative investments make social payo¤s nonlinear in trust. Alternatively, a fraction of
agents may be naifs rather than perfect Bayesians.
58For agentsequilibrium behavior and reputations in such a model (with an exogenously given level of incentives),
see Bénabou and Tirole [2006a]. In this continuous specication the mean of the preference distribution (the vs) no
longer a¤ects reputations, but its variances and covariances do (as does the mean of agentss).
59 If reputational payo¤s are of the form  (E[vja]); similarly, the reputational return  (v) is such that 0 = M+F 0  0    M F 0  0; so a concave  pushes toward complementarity, and a convex one toward substitutability.
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require such global properties. Proposition 2 applies whatever is the shape of g and thus ; and
Propositions 2 and 6 apply on any interval of  or e such that 0(v) remains bounded away from
zero. Furthermore, whereas the size of the multiplier and the direction in which a principal wants
to strategically bias his disclosures hinge on the sign of 0; our results about when expressive
concerns lead to weaker or tougher laws (Propositions 6 and 8) are entirely independent of it.
They would thus also carry over to most other forms of reputational payo¤s, including for instance
non-monotonic preferences for conformityas in Bernheim [1994].
 The scope of norms. While we do not explicitly model the enforcement of social sanctions
and rewards that typically underlie reputational payo¤s, one can already identify several intuitive
factors that will also contribute to the emergence of norms (0 < 0) or a quest for distinction
(0 > 0): A rst one is asymmetry in the feasibility of social rewards and punishments. In most
public-goods experiments, for instance, agents can punish free-riders but not reward model citizens.
This perhaps reects the fact that, in many decentralized interactions, it is cheaper to hurt than
to reward someone (at the same monetary or utility-equivalent level). In such cases the socially
enforced payo¤ reduces to  M (v); leading to unmitigated complementarity and strong norms.
The same e¤ect obtains when good actions may be unrelated to type (false positives) with some
probability, while conversely the existence of plausible but unveriable excuses for not contributing
weakens the inferences that can be drawn from it, thus dampening stigma relative to honor.60
Next, when agents are more concerned about a given behavior (say, a¤ecting the environment),
they tend to pay more attention to how others behave along this dimension, and to be more willing
to enforce social sanctions on them. By making  increasing in ; this will cause optimal incentives
to decline faster (or, where 0 > 0; increase slower) with average societal concerns, and thus
further amplify the bad newsabout average preferences expressed by strong incentives. Finally,
participating more in some behavior, such as volunteering or ghting for ones group, can make
it easier to observe who else does so. In this case  depends positively on a; resulting in a larger
social multiplier and a greater likelihood that powerful social norms will emerge, but again with a
qualitatively similar impact on how optimal incentives vary with societal preferences.
 Individual and social preferences. We have assumed that agents try to signal their
commitment (v) to a specic cause environment, rm, countryto an audience that cares about
it. In other contexts, they could instead signal a broader concern for welfare. For example, an
individual with type v, instead of internalizing ve where e is the externality, could also have concern
for taxpayerss costs and thus internalize v[e   (1 + )y]: Stocking [2011] provides experimental
evidence that agents take into account the eviction e¤ect of receiving an incentive. Relatedly,
De¤ains and Fluet [2010] consider strict liability law, which forces harm-doers to fully compensate
their victims; this is similar to y = e (and implicitly assumes  = 0): The individual experiences
no moral disutility since the victim is made whole (zero net externality); as a result, there is no
60For the exact form of (v) when participation or non-participation may be subject to unobservable shocks, see
Bénabou and Tirole [2006a].
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reputational e¤ect either, since behavior becomes uncorrelated with concern for others.61 With
realistic transaction or enforcement costs, however, strict liability will be suboptimal, thus bringing
back reputation and the interactions of laws and norms.
It could also be the principal who has di¤erent preferences. First, the case where he puts a
weight less than one on agentstotal welfare and derives private benets from their contributions
can be renormalized into a planners problem (see Section 1.1). Second, a social planner could
value di¤erently the material welfare of agents with di¤erent types, or those of contributors and
abstainers. This corresponds to an objective function of the form
W (v; y; ) =
Z +1
v
h+(v; e; c) g(v)dv +
Z v
 1
h (v; e; c) g(v)dv   y[1 G(v)] (35)
where v is the equilibrium cuto¤, h+ and h  are any two functions of v such that h+  h ; and
the last term represents the deadweight loss from transfers. More generally, consider: (i) any cuto¤
rule v = v(y; ^) describing agents behavior as a function of the incentive and their (point) belief
about ; with @v=@y < 0; (ii) any objective function of the form W = (v; )   y[1   G(v)]
such that @2=@v@ = 0 where @=@v = 0 satised, in particular, by (35). We show in the
Appendix that (under appropriate regularity conditions) the key result on expressive content over
 leading to weaker incentives no matter whether @v=@^ < 0 (corresponding to complementarity)
or @v=@^ > 0 (substitutability) will again hold in any separating equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
The papers main results can be summarized by two multipliers: a social multiplier, measuring
how reputational payo¤s depend on the frequency of di¤erent behaviors in the population, and an
informational multiplier, reecting how perceptions of societal preferences and prevailing norms
are a¤ected by the policies of an informed principal. Optimal incentives take both into account,
resulting in two departures from standard Pigou-Ramsey taxation. First, because incentives are
shown to generate crowding out for rare, heroic behaviors but crowding-in for common, merely
respectable ones, their optimal level depends (nonmonotonically) on the private cost of the behavior
and the distribution of intrinsic motivations in society, neither of which plays a role in the standard
Pigovian rule. Second, expressive concerns always lead to weaker incentives when the principals
information involves the general goodnessof society (more generally, the strength of social norms),
61Fuster and Meier [2010] nd that when incentives are provided (by the experimenter) a public-goods game with
punishments, players sanction free-riders less, and the latter show a lesser response (increase in contribution) in
subsequent rounds. Due to this form of crowding out of norm enforcement, incentives are found to be much less
e¤ective than when decentralized punishments are not feasible. The nding is again consistent with the idea that
when shirkers already pay compensation there is less need for them to feel guilty, and for others to stigmatize them,
than when their actions remain unpriced. Of course, agentsviews on how to price an externality (or on the social
welfare criterion) will often di¤er considerably. For instance, a polluting rm that pays a tax equal to the average
(or median) agents assessment of the externality it imposes may still be subject to boycotts by those who care more
about its environmental impact.
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and to stronger ones when it concerns the spillovers created by agentsbehavior.
There are several directions in which our analysis could be interestingly expanded. First, we
have taken the distribution of preferences as exogenous. This is a good approximation when the
population is xed, such as for a country. By contrast, a rm may choose to segregate workers with
heterogeneous values into sub-units where di¤erent norms will prevail, and likewise for a school
with its students. There can also be self-sorting through cooptation and exit in organizations, or
through migration across neighborhoods and regions. Extending the model to deal with segregation
both equilibrium and optimalcould thus shed light on local variations in norms and institutions.
Second, the coevolution of norms, law, and the social meaning of private and public actions, o¤ers
a vast and promising topic for future research.62
62On socially-minded behavior and sorting, see Besley and Ghatak [2005] and Fisher and Huddart [2008]. On the
evolutionary dynamics of norms, see e.g., Guiso et al., [2008] Tabellini [2008], Greif [2009] and Acemoglu and Jackson
[2011].
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Appendix
Properties of the  function. Recall that  is minimized at v = 0 (by normalization of the
vs) and that we strengthened the quasiconcavity implied by the second part of Lemma 1 to assume
that it is strictly decreasing on [vmin; 0] and strictly increasing on [0; vmax]: This implies that for
any small ~" > 0;there exists (~") > 0 such that
0(v) <  (~") on (vmin + ~"; ~") and 0(v) > (~") on (~"; vmax   ~"): (A.1)
Note also that
0(v) =
g(v)
1 G(v) [M
+(v)  v]  g(v)
G(v)
[v  M (v)];
so j0j is clearly bounded on (vmin; vmax): At the boundaries, lHopitals rule yields 0(vmin) =
g(vmin)(v vmin) 1=2 and 0(vmax) = 1=2 g(vmax)(vmax v); hence 0 is bounded on [vmin; vmax]:
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) Let us express (12) as F (ySI(); ) = 0; where
F (y; )  e+ v(y)  c  

y +
1 + 0(v

(y))
h(v

(y))

; (A.2)
with all functions in the bracketed term evaluated at v(y) =  + v

0(y + ): Since h is strictly
positive and continuously di¤erentiable (C1) everywhere, so is F , with
Fy(y; ) =
 1
1 + 0
  

1  
00
h   h0(1 + 0)
h2

1
1 + 0

  1
1 + 0(v(y; )  ) [1  (v

(y)  )] : (A.3)
Since h and have continuous derivatives, the function (v) is bounded on V: Let 1  1= supv2V f(v)g
when this number is positive and 1 = +1 otherwise. Thus, F (y; ) is strictly decreasing in y
whenever  < 1: Next, observe that for y = yFB() the non-bracketed terms in (A.2) sum to zero,
so F (yFB(); ) < 0 for all : We also have F (0; ) > 0 if
e+ v(0)  c > 

1 + 0(v(0)  )
h(v(0))  )

;
or equivalently by (5) and the identity v(0)   = v0() :
e  (v0()) > 

1 + 0(v0())
h(v0())

: (A.4)
From (14), e (v) > 0 for all v 2 V; so this expression is bounded on V = [vmin; vmax] : Therefore
2  inf
v2V

[e  (v)]h(v)
1 + 0(v)

> 0; (A.5)
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and for  < min f1; 2g the function F (; ) has a (unique) zero ySI() 2 (0; yFB()): q
(ii) We focus here on the case 1 > 0; and denote "1  1   0; the case with 2 < 0 can be
treated symmetrically. By the implicit function theorem,
dySI()
d
=
 F(y; )
Fy(y; )
=
0
1+0
+ 
h
00h h0(1+0)
h2

1
1+0
i
1
1+0
+ 
h
1  00h h0(1+0)
h2

1
1+0
i ; (A.6)
evaluated at v(y
SI()): We next show that that 0(v

(y
SI())) is negative and bounded away
from zero on (1; 2): First, note that
v(y
SI())   = 0    + 

ySI() +
1 + 0(v

(y
SI()))
h(v

(y
SI()))

: (A.7)
Fix "
00
with "
00
< 1   0 and dene
3  1   0   "
00
supv2V [e+ (1 + 0(v))=h(v)]
> 0: (A.8)
Since ySI() < yFB() < e; when  < min f1; 2; 3g ; v(ySI ; )    <  "0 for all  in (1; 2):
Next, since (1; 2)  , we have by (8) 0     c  e   > vmin + "; so there exists 4 2 (0; 3)
such that for all  < 4; v(ySI ; )   > vmin + "=2: Denoting "0  minf"00 ; "=2g; and 0  ("0);
property (A.1) therefore implies that
0(v(y
SI())  ) <  0 for all  2 (1; 2): (A.9)
Finally, let us dene
5  0

sup
v2V

00h  h0(1 + 0)
h2

> 0: (A.10)
Thus, for  <   min f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g ; (@F=@y)(ySI(); ) < 0 and (A.6) implies that ySI() is
strictly decreasing on (1; 2): We shall denote FI(y) its inverse function. 
Proof of Proposition 4We rst verify that the principal discloses if and only if v(y)  v~F (y):
Indeed, in that case disclosure leads to a welfare gain ofZ v~F (y)
v (y)
(e+ v   c  y)g(v)dv >
Z v~F (y)
v (y)
(e+ v(y)  c  y)g(v)dv
=
Z v~F (y)
v (y)
(e  (v(y))  (1 + ))g(v)dv > 0:
by (16), whereas when v(y) > v

nd(y) it generates a loss of
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Z v~F (y)
v (y)
(e+ v   c  y)g(v)dv >
Z v~F (y)
v (y)
(e+ v(y)  c  y)g(v)dv
=
Z v~F (y)
v (y)
(e  (v(y))  (1 + ))g(v)dv > 0:
due to the same condition.
We next analyze the xed-point problem (20). Since F~ is decreasing in 1   q and in ~; so
is vF~(y); by (18): a lack of disclosure is better news (and therefore leads to more participation)
the less likely it is that the principal has information, and the more selective his disclosure policy.
Consequently, the right-hand side of (20) is decreasing in ~ and 1   q; since the left-hand-side is
decreasing in ~ there could in general be multiple intersections. We now show that there always
exists one where ~ 7! v~(y) cuts ~ 7! vF~(y) from above, which corresponds (since both functions
are decreasing) to a stable equilibrium (i.e., a point where d[
 
v~
 1
(vF~(y))]=d
~ < 1). Indeed, as
~ tends to 2; F~ tends to the prior F and v

2
(y) < vF (y) since F puts positive mass on [1; 2);
as ~ tends to 1; F~ also tends to F (see (19)) and v

1
(y) > vF (y) since F puts positive mass
on (1; 2]: Therefore, there is at least one ~q 2 (1; 2) where the two curves intersect and where
d[v~(y)  vF~(y)]=d~ < 0; since this di¤erence is decreasing in q; ~q is locally decreasing in q: 
Proof or Proposition 5 For  = 0; @WAI =@y is proportional to e c+v^(y)(y): If the planner
sets yAI()  e   (c   e); this policy is invertible on any interval that does not contain 0:
Agents thus correctly infer ; and the participation cuto¤ is
v(y
AI())  v(e (c  e)) = c  e+ (c  e)  (c  e) = c  e:
Therefore, for all ; @WAI =@y = 0 for y = e  (c  e): Strict quasiconcavity then implies that
this is the optimal policy under asymmetric information when the planner observes that value :
To show uniqueness, let y() be some other function that equates the left-hand side of (23) to
zero for all  2 [1; 2]: If the rst term in brackets is zero, then v(y()) = c   e = v(yFB());
therefore y() = yFB(): If the second term is zero, y() is a solution to the di¤erential equation
y0 () = 0 (v

 (y()) = 
0(v (y())  ), and as any separating equilibrium it must also satisfy
the boundary condition y(1) = ySI(1) = yFB(1): Since 0 has bounded derivatives, standard
standard theorems ensure that the solutions to this initial-value problem is unique. Note, however,
that yFB() = e    (c  e) satises that same di¤erential equation and coincides with y() at
the boundary. Therefore, the two must be equal. 
Proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 6 Fix (1; 2)  ; with 0 < 1; and again denote
"1  1 0 > 0: The case 2 < 0 can be treated symmetrically. By Proposition 2, for  <  there
exists a decreasing function (which depends on ) ySI : [1; 2]! [ySI (2) ; ySI(1)]  (0; yFB())
that solves the full-information problem, F (ySI(); ) = 0:
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Let y1  ySI(1) and consider now the initial-value problem dened by ^(y1)  1 and the
di¤erential equation (22), which we rewrite as
IV P () : ^
0
(y) = 	(y; ^(y)); with ^(y1)  1; (A.11)
where
	(y; ) =
F (y; )
0(v

(y))[e  c  y + v(y)]
; (A.12)
and F (y; ) is still given by (A.2).
The proof will proceed in three steps. First, we show existence of a unique local solution
^(y) on some left-neighborhood of y1: We then establish key properties of this function, including
monotonicity; this is the most di¢ cult step. Finally, we use these properties to show that the
function can be (uniquely) extended to a global solution, mapping some interval [y2; y1] with y2 > 0
into [1; 2]; its inverse, yAI(); is therefore dened on all of (1; 2): To lighten notation, we shall
abbreviate the function v
^(y)
(y) as simply v^(y):
 Step 1: local existence and uniqueness. The function 	(y; ) and its partial derivatives are
well-dened and continuous at every point where the denominator terms, e   c   y + v(y) and
0(v(y) ), are non-zero. In particular, at (y1; 1) = (ySI(1); 1) we have e c y1+v1(y1) > 0
due to (15). Moreover, (A.9) implies that, at  = 1; 01(v

(y1))   1) <  0 < 0: Therefore,
	(y; ) has bounded derivatives in a neighborhood of the form [y1 z; y1] [1 z0; 1 +z0]; implying
by standard theorems that the initial-value problem IV P () has a unique solution dened on some
local left-neighborhood of y1: Let (~y; y1] denote the maximal (left-)interval on which such a unique
solution satisfying (y) 2 [1; 2] exists, and let ^; or for short ^ : (~y; y1] ! (1; ~]; denote that
solution. k
Step 2: properties of the solution. Fix any "0 such that h( "0) > 0 and
0 < "0 < min

"; 1   v1(y1); 1   0
	
(A.13)
and dene
  min

h( "0) (1   0   "0)
1 + yFB(1)h( "0) ;


> 0: (A.14)
Lemma 2 For all  < ; the function ^ has the following properties on its support:
(i) b(y)  e  c  y + v^(y) is strictly decreasing, and therefore bounded below by b(y1) > 0:
(ii) v^(y)  ^(y) is bounded above by  "0; implying in particular 0(v^(y)  ^(y)) < 0:
Proof. (i) We have
b0(y) =  +
 1 + 0
^(y)
(v^(y)) b0(y)
1 + 0
^(y)
(v^(y))
=    
h^(y)(v^(y))[e  c  y + v^(y)]
:
34
Therefore, b0(y) < 0 wherever b(y) > 0: Since b(y1) > 0 by (15), this implies that b is decreasing on
all of [1; ~]; and thus bounded below by b(y1) > 0:
(ii) Note rst that:
d[v^(y)  ^(y)]
dy
=
d(v0(y + ^(y)))
dy
=   1 + ^
0
(y)
1 + 0(v^(y)  ^(y))
=
 1
0(v^(y)  ^(y))
"
1  
h(v^(y))  ^(y))[e  c  y + v^(y)]
#
: (A.15)
Suppose now that (ii) does not hold, and let y0 be the largest y 2 [~y; y1] such that v^(y) ^(y) =  "0:
Then,
h(v
^(y0)(y
0))  ^(y0))[e  c  y0 + v
^(y0)(y
0)]
= h( "0)( 0   y0 + ^(y0)  "0) > h( "0)
 
1   0   "  y0

> h( "0)  1   0   "0   y1 > h( "0)  1   0   "0   yFB(1) > : (A.16)
The bracketed term in (A.15)is therefore positive, and since 0(v
^(y0)
(y0)   ^(y0)) = 0( "0) < 0
this implies that the function v^(y)  ^(y) is increasing at y0: Since at y1 it is strictly below  "0 by
(A.13), there must exists some y00 2 (y0; y1) where it equals  " again, a contradiction. k
Lemma 3 For all  <  :
(i) Wherever ^(y) lies below FI(y) (respectively, above it) on [~y; y1]; ^ must be decreasing (re-
spectively, increasing).
(ii) Consequently, the two curves intersect only at y1; ^ lies everywhere below FI ; and the function
^(y) is strictly decreasing.
(iii) Compliance is strictly lower under asymmetric information.
(iv) v^(y)  ^(y) 2 (vmin + "0; "0) therefore 0(v^(y)  ^(y)) is bounded above by  ("0):
Proof : (i) We have shown that
e+ v^(y)  c  y > 0 > 0
^(y)
(v^(y)): (A.17)
Equation (22) therefore implies that ^
0
(y)  0 if and only if
e+ v^(y)  c  
1 + 0
^(y)
(v^(y))
 
h^(y)(v^(y))
; (A.18)
which by (12) means that @WFI
^(y)
=@y  0 at y: By strict quasiconcavity ofWFI
^(y)
(y); this is equivalent
to y  ySI(^(y)); or FI(y)  ^(y):
(ii) Where the two curves intersect, the above inequalities must all be equalities, and in partic-
ular it must be that ^
0
(y) = 0: Since FI is a decreasing function, ^
0
(y1) = 0 > (
FI)0(y1); so just to
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the left of y1; ^(y) lies below the decreasing curve FI(y): It cannot cut it elsewhere, since at any
such intersection ^ would have to be steeper than FI ; while at the same time having a horizontal
derivative, a contradiction. The last part of the claim follows from (i).
(iii) and (iv) From (9), we have v^(y)  ^(y) = v(y+ ^(y)) > v(y+ AI(y)) > v(y+ FB(y)) =
c   e > vmin + "; where the rst inequality (establishing (iii)) follows from (ii) above, the second
from the fact that ySI() < yFB() for all ; and the last one from (8) together with "0 < ". In
Lemma 2 we showed that v^(y)  ^(y) is bounded above by  "0; so we now have both parts of (A.1),
implying the last claim in (iv). k
Step 3: existence and uniqueness of a global solution for yAI on (1; 2). Recall that ^(y)
is strictly decreasing on [~y; y1] and that ^(y) 2 [1; 2] as this is part of the joint denition of
[~y; y1] and ^: Therefore, as y ! ~y from above, ^ (~y) tends to a limit ^(~y)  2: Note now that
Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that 	 has bounded derivatives (hence satises the Lipschitz conditions)
on [~y; y1] [1; ^(~y)] : It therefore cannot be that ^(~y) < 2; otherwise we can (uniquely) extend
^ to some left-neighborhood of ~y by solving the di¤erential equation (A.12) with initial condition
(~y; ^(~y)); and still have ^(y) remain in (1; 2); contradicting the earlier denition of the maximal
interval (~y; y1]: Therefore ^(~y) = 2; proving that ^ is a (unique) global solution to IPV ();
mapping [~y; y1] onto [1; 2]; with ^
0
< 0 and (by Lemma 3(i), ^(y) < AI(y) for all y < y1:
Dening y2  ~y the inverse function yAI  ^ 1 concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 7 Given the assumptions made following (27), the function (y; )  y+
(1 + ) 1 [=h (v (y)  )  eb] is then increasing in y;  and ; with (0; ) < 0; or< (eb= (1 + ) ; ):
Hence ySI() is uniquely dened and decreasing in  and , with 0 < ySI() < yFB()=(1 + ):
Turning now to the di¤erential equation (28), it can be rewritten as
^
0
(y) =
 
1 + 0
^(y)
(va (y))
0
^(y)
(va (y))
! 
eb + v

b (y)  cb   y   =h^(y) (vb (y))
ea   ca + va (y)
!
g (v

b (y))
g (va (y))

: (A.19)
Consider the initial-value problem dened by (A.19) and the initial condition ^(y1) = FI(y1), where
FI   ySI 1 is a decreasing function, and y1  ySI(1): Since we imposed ea ca+va  ySI () > 0;
the di¤erential equation is well-behaved, so the initial-value problem has a unique solution ^(y) in a
some left-neighborhood [y2; y1] of the initial condition. Moreover since 0
 
va
 
ySI ()
  0; ^ (y)
is strictly decreasing as long as
eb + v

b (y)  cb   y >

h^(y)
 
vb (y)
 : (A.20)
Where this last condition holds, we also know that @WFI (y) =@y > 0 and, by quasiconcavity of
WFI ; we conclude that y < ySI(^ (y)); or equivalently FI (y) < ^ (y) : Therefore ^ (:) is decreasing
if and only if FI (y)  ^ (y) :
Now, observe that wherever ^ (y) and FI (y) intersect, it must be that eb + vb (y)  cb   y =
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=h (v

b (y)) ; and consequently ^
0
= 0 at the intersection point. Such is the case at the initial
point y1  FI(1); therefore ^0 (y) >
 
FI
0
(y) and ^ (y) > FI (y) on some left-neighborhood of
y1: Suppose the two curves intersect at more than one point, and let z < y be the largest such
intersection. At that point ^ must cut FI from above, meaning that ^
0
(y) <
 
FI
0
(y) < 0;
which contradicts the fact that ^
0
(y) = 0: Therefore the two curves intersect only at y1, implying
that ^ (y) > FI (y) and ^
0
< 0 on (y2; y1]. Equivalently, yAI  ^ 1 is decreasing on [1; 2]; and
yAI ()  ySI () with strict inequality except at 1: 
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof follows steps very similar to those used for Proposition
6; it is omitted to avoid repetition and economize on space, but is available upon request. 
Proof of Proposition 9. We will show the claimed properties of the symmetric-information
solution pFI() for  = 0; in which case v(p) = c p: By continuity, they extend to  small enough.
Denoting 0     ; under full information the rst-order condition (equation (34) with  = 0)
becomes  
WFI0
0
(p)  (e  p) g (c  p) + 0 [pg (c  p) G (c  p)] = 0;
For  = 0; the objective functionWFI0 (p) is strictly quasiconcave, since it is clear that if
 
WFI0
0
(p) =
0 then
 
WFI0
00
(p) < 0: By continuity (since all functions involved are continuously di¤erentiable),
this remains true for jj small enough. The optimal policy pFI(0) is then uniquely dened by the
rst order condition, which can be rewritten as
 (p; 0)  e  p+ 0 [p  k (c  p)] = 0; (A.21)
where k(v)  G(v)=g(v): The function  is such that
@ 
@p
(p; 0)   1 + 0 1 + k0 (p  c) = 0; @ 
@0
(p; 0) = p  k (c  p) : (A.22)
The rst derivative is negative as long as
0 j1 + k0 (p  c)j < 1; which holds for  not too large
since k0 is bounded from below (as g > 0 on [vmin; vmax]: The second derivative is also negative
provided p < k (c  p) ; for 0 > 0 this holds at p = pFI(0) if and only if e > p; meaning that
 (e; 0) < 0; or e < k(c  e); for 0 < 0 it holds if and only if e < p; meaning that  (e; 0) > 0; or
again e < k(c e): Since we assumed that eg(c e)=G(c e) < 1 (which can be ensured, for instance,
as long as eg(vmax) < 1), this condition holds as well. Consequently, for
0 j1 + k0 (p  c)j < 1;
the implicit function theorem ensures that pFI(0) is strictly increasing in 0:
Consider now the case of asymmetric information. The di¤erential equation (34) can be rewrit-
ten as
^0 (p) =

e  c+ v (p) + p (  ^ (p) )
1 + 0 (v (p))

g (v (p))  (  ^ (p) )G (v (p))
   (p;  (p)) ; (A.23)
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Since   (p; ) has bounded derivatives, there is a unique solution to (A.23) with boundary condition
^(p1) = 
FI(p1) = 1; where p1  pFI(1): Furthermore, at any point where ^ (p1) = FI (p1) ; it
must be that   (p; ^ (p)) = 0; hence ^0(p) = 0 <
 
FI
0
(p); where the inequality was established
earlier (for
0 = j  j and  small enough). Therefore, ^0(p) is everywhere below FI(p) on its
support [p1; p2]; implying in turn   (p; ^ (p)) > 0; which by (34) yields ^0(p) > 0: 
Proof for Section 5. We provide here the key arguments in the proof relative to expressive
content over  under the more general objective function and threshold rules introduced at the end
of Section 5. Since our objective is only to show the robustness of the key insight, we simply take
as given the existence and di¤erentiability of the relevant solutions (but these could be established
as they were for previous propositions).
Denoting ^(y) the value of  which agents will infer (in a separating equilibrium) from his choice
of y; the principal maximizes over y
	(y) = (v(y; ^(y)); )  y[1 G(v(y; ^(y)))];
leading to the rst-order condition:
@
@v
+ yg(v(y; ^(y))  )
 
@v
@y
+
@v
@^
^
0
(y)

= [1 G(v(y; ^))]: (A.24)
In the Pigovian case where  = 0 this reduces (together with the equilibrium condition ^ = )
to @(v(yFB(); ); )=@v = 0; or v(yFB(); ); ) = arg maxy : When  > 0; the (Ramsey)
solution under symmetric information, ySI(); is given by (A.24) where ^
0
is set to zero; therefore
@(v(ySI(); ); )=@v < 0; implying v(ySI(); ) > v(yFB(); ) and hence ySI() < yFB()
provided  is strictly quasi-concave in v; which we will assume. If W has that same property
(which will be the case for  small enough), the solution under asymmetric information, yAI()
is then such that yAI() < yFB() if and only if @W (v(yAI(); ); )=@y > 0; if and only if
^
0
(yAI) (@v=@y) < 0; or equivalently (yAI)0() (@v=@y) < 0: For  small enough, (yAI)0 will have
the same sign as (yFB)0 (the formal proof would follow the same steps as in that of Lemma 1 and
Proposition 6); totally di¤erentiating @(v(yFB(); ); )=@v = 0 yields
@2
@2v

@v
@y
dyFB +
@v
@^
d

+
@2
@v@
= 0; (A.25)
Given the assumed property of the objective function that @2=@v@ = 0 where @=@v = 0;
it follows that (dyAI=d) (@v=@y) < 0; hence the result. 
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